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An Argument in Support of Tax-Free Per-Cap
Distribution Payments Derived from Native
American Nations Gaming Sources
ARTHUR ACEVEDO*
Gaming activities play important social, cultural, and economic roles
for many Native American tribes. During the 1970s and 1980s, gaming activities spread throughout the country, and became more accessible to nonnative individuals. This growth in gaming activities drew the attention of
state and local officials who sought to limit and regulate Native American
gaming.
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the State of California, arguing before the Supreme Court, asserted that it could exercise jurisdiction over Native American gaming activities. In a stunning defeat, the Supreme Court ruled against the State of California when it announced its decision in 1987. The Cabazon decision effectively removed all state and local
regulatory oversight from Native American gaming activities, thereby leaving states powerless to regulate this area. In response to Cabazon, Congress
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) in 1988. The purpose
of IGRA is to regulate Indian gaming activities conducted by Native American tribes. A key feature of IGRA allows tribes to make discretionary percapita distributions to members of its tribe from the net revenues of its gaming operations. However, one of IGRA’s distribution conditions requires that
per-capita payments be “subject to Federal taxation.” That means per-capita payments are counted toward one’s income.
Section 61 of the Income Tax Code defines gross income for income tax
purposes. In broad and sweeping language, § 61 provides that “gross income
includes all income from whatever source derived.” This language is structured to capture all forms of income. The IRS has stated in a private letter
ruling that per-capita distributions constitute gross income under § 61 of the
Income Tax Code. Notwithstanding § 61’s broad language, a taxpayer may
exclude an item from income only by proving that such item qualifies under
one of the exclusionary tax provisions of the Income Tax Code.
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This Article argues that per-capita distributions qualify for exclusion
from gross income as a gift. This Article first discusses the evolution and
regulation of the gaming industry within the Native American community.
Next, this Article examines the controversial history of defining “gross income” since the enactment of the federal income tax in 1913. Finally, this
Article presents several arguments supporting the proposition that per-capita distribution payments constitute gifts under the Income Tax Code—and
are therefore non-taxable to the recipient.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SYNOPSIS ............................................................ 67
II. HISTORY AND IMPACT OF GAMING WITHIN THE NATIVE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY ......................................................................................... 68
A. PUBLIC LAW 280 – CEDING FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF TRIBES TO THE
STATES ........................................................................................... 70
B. SEMINOLE V. BUTTERWORTH ....................................................... 72
C. CALIFORNIA V. CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS ................ 74
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORY AND CHALLENGE IN DEFINING THE
CONTOURS OF “GROSS INCOME” UNDER THE INCOME TAX CODE ...... 77
A. GROSS INCOME ............................................................................. 77
B. PRIZES AND AWARDS.................................................................... 80
C. GIFTS............................................................................................. 82
IV. ARE PER CAPITA PAYMENTS GIFTS? CONSTRUCTING THE GIFT
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 86
A. INCOME TAX STATUTE AND REGULATIONS................................... 87
B. COMMON LAW ANALYSIS ............................................................. 87
C. IGRA STATUTORY ANALYSIS ....................................................... 90
D. THE EXCLUSIONARY PROVISO ...................................................... 94
E. ARE TRIBAL PER CAPITA PAYMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THE ALASKA
PERMANENT FUND DISTRIBUTION PAYMENTS? ............................. 95
F. ARE PER CAPITA PAYMENTS SIMILAR TO UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION? ............................................................................ 98
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 98

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SYNOPSIS

In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(“IGRA”).1 The purpose of IGRA is to regulate Indian gaming activities conducted by Native American tribes by “establish[ing] a detailed regulatory,

1.

25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-21 (West 2016).
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record keeping, and reporting regime for tribal gaming” activities.2 A key
feature of IGRA is that it allows tribes to make per capita distributions to
members of its tribe from the net revenues of the gaming operations. However, one of IGRA’s distribution conditions requires that per capita payments
be “subject to Federal taxation.”3
Section 614 of the Income Tax Code is the section that defines income
for income tax purposes. Section 61 is the default provision that captures all
forms of income. Specifically, section 61 provides that gross income includes
“all income from whatever source derived.”5 The IRS has stated that per capita distributions constitute gross income under section 61 of the Income Tax
Code.6
Despite the broad sweep of the Income Tax Code, and IGRA’s requirement that per capita payments be “subject to federal taxation”7, I construct
an argument supporting the proposition that per capita distributions should
not be subject to federal tax. Specifically, I argue per capita payments constitute gifts under the Income Tax Code and are therefore, excludable from
gross income.
This Paper explores the question, whether gaming distributions can be
excluded from gross income as a gift. Part II discusses the evolution and the
regulation of the gaming industry within the Native American community.
Part III discusses the controversial history in defining “gross income” under
the Income Tax Code. Part IV presents arguments supporting the proposition
that per capita payments are gifts. Part V presents the conclusion.

II. HISTORY AND IMPACT OF GAMING WITHIN THE NATIVE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY
“Gaming activities have become a significant source of revenue for
many Indian tribes.”8 The National Indian Gaming Commission reports that
as of 2014, Indian gaming is a 28.5-billion-dollar industry.9 There are 567
2. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-40-12, Overview of Federal Tax Provisions and
Analysis of Selected Issues Relating to Native American Tribes and Their Members 11 (May
14, 2012), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4426.
3. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2016).
4. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2016).
5. Id.
6. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199908006 (Feb. 26, 1999), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/9908006.pdf.
7. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2016).
8. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-40-12, Overview of Federal Tax Provisions and
Analysis of Selected Issues Relating to Native American Tribes and Their Members 21 (2012).
9. 2014 Indian Gaming Revenues Increase 1.5 Percent, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING
COMM’N (July 23, 2015), http://www.nigc.gov/news/detail/2014-indian-gaming-revenues-increase.
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federally recognized tribes in the United States as of 201610 with “236 Indian
tribes operating 422 casinos of varying sizes within 28 of the States.”11
Gambling activities create the public perception that it generates vast
sums of wealth and financial opportunity for Native Americans. One paper
notes that “[o]n the whole, Indian gaming has made and continues to make
significant contributions to the U.S. economy. Specifically, it has stimulated
economic activity, created jobs, and provided wages-all of which have benefitted tribal economies and generated tax revenue to federal, state, and local
governments.”12
Separating the reality of Indian gaming from its myth becomes important when evaluating policy decisions relating to Native nations. “There
is a growing belief in American society that Indians have struck it rich with
the establishment of Indian casinos.” The reality, however, is that gaming
activities have not generated broad macro-level economic relief for many
Native Americans. “[The] unemployment [rate] among adult Indians is about
15 percent – roughly three times the national average – and Native Americans
remain America’s poorest people.”13 Moreover, “[a]n estimated 23 percent
of all Native American families in the United States. . . earned incomes that
are below the poverty line.”14 These statistics confirm that the American
Dream of economic prosperity and economic security enjoyed by other segments of the American society continues to elude Native Americans.
Gaming activities have deep roots within the Native American culture.
However, “[g]aming certainly isn’t new to Native Americans.”15 What is new
is Indian gaming’s explosive growth as a source of revenue. From 1988 to
2013, gaming revenues grew at a compound annual growth rate of 25.29%
from $100 million to $28.5 billion.16

10. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).
11. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2.
12. Alan P. Meister, Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Indian Gaming and
Beyond: Tribal Economic Development and Diversification, 54 S.D. L. REV. 375, 383 (2009).
13. Dispelling the Myths about Indian Gaming, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND,
http://www.narf.org/indian-gaming/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
14. U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, 2013 American Indian Population and Labor Force
Report 11 (2014), http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc1-024782.pdf
(data reported for year ending 2010).
15. History of Native American Gaming, SANTA YNEZ BAND OF CHUMASH INDIANS,
http://www.santaynezchumash.org/gaming_history.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
16. Randall K. Q. Akee, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effects on American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. ECON.
PERSP. 185, 186 (2015); S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 3072 (1988); NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N,
2014 Tribal Gaming Revenues by Gaming Operation Revenue Range,
http://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/reports/2014GGRbyGamingOperationRevenueRange.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
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PUBLIC LAW 280 – CEDING FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF
TRIBES TO THE STATES

Indian nation sovereignty is a complex issue. The regulation of Indian
tribes raises vexing questions concerning jurisdiction, sovereignty, and selfgovernance. Indian tribes are subject to the plenary power of the United
States government. The plenary power claimed by the United States government over Indian nations is rationalized on the basis of a divestment theory,
which asserts:
Indian tribes are . . . no longer ‘possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty.’ Their incorporation
within the territory of the United States, and their
acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested
them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they
had previously exercised. By specific treaty provision they yielded up other sovereign powers; by
statute, in the exercise of its plenary control, Congress has removed still others.17
Native nations’ claims of sovereignty and self-governance have been
blunted by federal policies of regulation and oversight. An inherent tension
between Native nations and the federal government exists over matters of
sovereignty often leading to jurisdictional conflicts between tribes and the
federal government. The degree of complexity for jurisdictional questions
intensifies when state and local governments seek to invoke their police powers of regulation. One commentator writes that:
When it comes to incorporating Indian tribes as
third sovereigns within the United States political
system, one has to acknowledge that unlike the sovereignty of the states, which is recognized under the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United
States Constitution, the tribes’ inherent sovereignty
and right to self-government is not guaranteed nor
protected in the Constitution. . . . To remedy this
problem, the tribes need either the trust doctrine, a

17.

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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constitutional amendment, or some organic congressional legislation that cannot be easily repealed.18
The remedy came in the form of a federal statute. In 1953, Congress
enacted Public Law 28019 to address the scope of jurisdiction state governments can exercise over tribal matters. Public Law 280 granted to state governments the authority to regulate Indian activities under limited circumstances. Prior to the enactment of Public Law 280, jurisdiction over criminal
and civil actions was shared between the federal government and tribal nations. When enacting Public Law 280, Congress’s primary concern “was [to
address] the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the
absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.”20 This federal
statute delegated to the states, Congress’s oversight power to regulate Indian
activities over tribal matters in criminal and civil matters. The initial delegation of authority was granted to six enumerated states.21 The federal statute
allowed additional state governments to opt in and access the delegated
power.22
“Section 2 of ‘Public Law 280[ ]’ . . . immediately placed enumerated
Indian lands under the full criminal jurisdiction of the states they were located in.”23 This allowed state governments to exercise their police powers
over Indians with respect to matters of state law.24 Moreover, “Section 7 of
‘Public Law 280’ granted the necessary federal consent for states to take full
criminal jurisdiction over all other Indian lands, if the state passed legislation

18. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 253, 263-64 (2009).
19. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 25 U.S.C. §§1321-26 (2010)).
20. Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976).
21. The six states are Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 (West 2016).
22. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1321(a) (West 2016) (regarding criminal jurisdiction, granting
“[t]he consent of the United States is hereby given to any State . . . to assume, with the consent
of the Indian tribe . . . which could be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all of such offenses.”) (emphasis added); see 25 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a) (West
2016) (mirroring the permissive grant to “any State” of §1321(a) but in a civil context).
23. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 895 (“Under [Public Law 280], Washington . . . took jurisdiction over its
Indian and Indian lands . . . [and] over eight specific subject areas chiefly welfare, family law
and motor vehicles but not gambling.”).
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to that effect.”25 President Eisenhower expressed “grave doubts”26 about Public Law 280 when he signed it into law. He explained:
My objection to the bill arises because of the inclusion in it of Sections 6 and 7. These Sections permit
other states to impose on Indian tribes within their
borders, the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the
state, removing the Indians from Federal jurisdiction, and, in some instances, effective self-government.27
Nonetheless, President Eisenhower signed the bill into law.
The explosive growth of Indian gaming during the last quarter of the
twentieth century did not go unnoticed by state and local governments. In
response, governments moved to regulate or prohibit Indian gaming activities
within their borders. The showdown between the competing claims of Indian
sovereignty and State Power reached the federal courts resulting in stinging
defeats for state and local governments, and wins for the Native tribes. Congress ultimately stepped in and enacted IGRA in 1988.
B.

SEMINOLE V. BUTTERWORTH

The conflict between Indian sovereignty and state power of regulation
played out in the federal courts in the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Butterworth.28 This is the first case where a federal court of appeals substantively reviewed the issue of gaming activities on an Indian reservation. The
issue centered on a jurisdictional conflict between Indian sovereignty and
State’s Power.
The Seminole Tribe sought to operate a bingo game on an Indian reservation. To achieve this objective, the Seminole Tribe entered into a contract
“with a private limited partnership that agreed to build and operate a bingo
hall on the Indian reservation in exchange for a percentage of the profits as
management fees.”29
The sheriff of Broward County, Florida, objected to the bingo gaming
activity of the tribe and sought to prevent the gaming activity. He “informed
the tribe that he would make arrests for any violations”30 of the state statute
25. Id.
26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Relating to
State Jurisdiction Over Cases Arising on Indian Reservations, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9674 (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
27. Id.
28. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. Id. at 311.
30. Id.
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prohibiting bingo operations.31 The “Seminole Indian tribe brought an action
. . . seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief . . . against the [local]
sheriff . . . .”32 In response to the suit initiated by the Seminole Indian Tribe,
“[t]he attorney general of the state of Florida filed a petition on behalf of the
state seeking leave to participate in the case as amicus curiae, and leave was
granted.”33
The State asserted that bingo activities are subject to state regulation.
The State relied on its grant of authority to regulate Indian tribes pursuant to
Public Law 280,34 arguing this law “permit[ted] states to exercise civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes.”35 In response, the Seminole Tribe
asserted its sovereign independence and resisted the State’s attempt at regulation.
The court of appeals began its analysis by examining the distinction between statutes that are “civil/regulatory”36 as distinguished from statutes that
are “criminal/prohibitory in nature.”37 The analytical framework distinguishing statutes that are civil/regulatory from criminal/prohibitory was established by the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Bryan v. Itasca County.38
The court of appeals acknowledged that “[i]f the [Florida] statute is [found
to be] civil/regulatory . . . the statute cannot be enforced against the Seminole
Tribe of Florida.”39
The court of appeals examined the Florida statute40 noting that its “general prohibition . . . does not apply to prevent ‘nonprofit or veterans’ organizations engaged in charitable, civic, community . . . or other similar activities
. . . from conducting bingo games . . . .”41 The court of appeals next examined
the Florida State Constitution noting that “lotteries . . . are . . . prohibited”
but that other types of “pari-mutuel pools authorized by law” are not prohibited. The court of appeals then examined a Florida State Supreme Court decision observing its deference to the State Legislature when the court of appeals noted that “the Supreme Court of Florida stated . . . the legislature, in
its wisdom, has seen fit to permit bingo as a form of recreation, and . . . has
allowed worthy organizations to receive the benefits.”42

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (repealed 1992).
Seminole, 658 F.2d at 311.
Id. at 311-12.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 (West 2016); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 2016).
Seminole, 658 F.2d at 311.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
Seminole, 658 F.2d at 314.
See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (repealed 1992).
Seminole, 658 F.2d at 314.
Id. (citing to Carrol v. State, 361 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1978).
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The court of appeals ruled in favor of the Seminole Tribe and held that
the State of Florida did not have the power to regulate bingo activities on the
Seminole Reservation, which was located within the State of Florida. The
court of appeals reasoned that “[b]ingo appears to fall in a category of gambling that the state has chosen to regulate by imposing certain limitation to
avoid abuses.”43 Critical to the court’s reasoning is the court’s finding that
the Florida state statute exempts charitable organizations and veteran’s organizations from the prohibition on gaming activities. As a result, the court
reasoned that “the bingo statute in question is regulatory,”44 and not prohibitory. The court “concluded that the Florida bingo statute cannot be enforced
against the Seminole tribe . . . .”45
C.

CALIFORNIA V. CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

The conflict between Indian Sovereignty and State Power continued to
play out in the federal courts. This time, however, the conflict presented itself
before the Supreme Court. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,46 the United States Supreme Court examined the question of Indian gambling activities. The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians operated bingo games on their reservation. The Cabazon Band also conducted
other cards games, including poker. The games were open to the public and
played by many non-Indians.
Interest in the outcome of the Cabazon decision was intense. California’s appeal, “supported by 20 other states . . . said at least 100 tribal bingo
operations existed in 19 states, generating ‘huge tribal revenues’ and providing ‘opportunities for organized criminal intrusion.’”47 State governments
saw their state interests and police powers being diminished while Native
tribes saw their sovereignty in the balance.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the declaration that “[t]he
Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory’ . . . and that ‘tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government,
not the States.’”48 The Supreme Court then restated its distinction between
43. Seminole, 658 F.2d at 314.
44. Id. at 315.
45. Id. at 316.
46. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), superseded
by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 11, 102 Stat. 247,
as recognized in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 U.S. 2024 (2014).
47. Supreme Court Roundup; Right Upheld to Present Situation at Confession, N.Y.
TIMES (June 10, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/10/us/supreme-court-roundupright-upheld-to-present-situation-at-confession.html.
48. California, 480 U.S. at 207.
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statutes that are prohibitory in nature from statutes that are regulatory in nature.
The Supreme Court noted that the State of California “statute does not
entirely prohibit the playing of bingo but permits it when the games are operated and staffed by members of designated charitable organizations . . . .”49
The State of California invoked Public Law 280 as its legal justification for
regulating gambling activities. 50 The State of California reasoned that pursuant to Public Law 280, it was granted the authority to regulate Indian gambling activities.51
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Cabazon Tribe stating that state
and local government cannot regulate the gaming activities of Indian tribes
unless the regulation qualifies as a criminal/prohibitory statute or unless Congress expressly granted States the power to regulate. The Supreme Court reasoned, “California does not prohibit all forms of gambling. California itself
operates a state lottery, and daily encourages its citizens to participate in this
state-run gambling.” The fact that a state permits an activity, albeit subject
to regulation, was critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis. The effect of the
Cabazon decision was to remove all state and local regulatory oversight from
Indian gaming activities. As a result of Cabazon, tribes were now free to engage in gaming activities without the burdens of any regulation.
Congress responded swiftly to the Cabazon decision. One year later, in
1988, Congress enacted IGRA. The Congressional policy behind IGRA
states that “the purpose of this Act is to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”52 Congress

49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 207.
51. Id.
52. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 3(1), 102 Stat. 247 (1988)
(codified as 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)). Two additional declared policies include:
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by
an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and
other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the
primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that
gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator
and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment
of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and to
protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.
Id.

76

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

37-1

also created a new administrative agency, “the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) [vesting it with] general oversight responsibility for Indian gaming”53 activities when it enacted IGRA.
IGRA “divides gaming [activities] on Indian lands into three classes . .
. and provides a different regulatory scheme for each class.”54 The term “class
I gaming” means social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in
connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations and is regulated solely by
the tribe.55 Class II gaming is defined as “the game of chance commonly
known as bingo. . .and card games that are explicitly authorized by the laws
of the State . . . .”56 and are regulated jointly between the tribe and the state
pursuant to a state compact.57 Class III gaming is IGRA’s catch-all provision
and includes “all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.”58 Class III is regulated jointly between the tribe, the state, and the Commissioner.59
In 1988, when IGRA was enacted “revenues from Indian gaming . . .
averaged around $200 million per year.”60 By 2014, Indian gaming swelled
to a 28.5-billion-dollar industry.61 Still, many Native Americans continued to
experience high unemployment and high poverty rates.62
53.
54.
55.
56.
games that

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2.
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015).
25 U.S.C.A. §2710(a)(1) (West 2016).
25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(7)(A)(i), (ii)(I) (West 2016). The same statute permits card

are not explicitly authorized and provide that if card games are
not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played
at any location in the State, but only if such card games are
played in conformity with those laws and regulations (if any) of
the State regarding hours or periods of operation of such card
games or limitations on wagers or pot sizes in such card games.
25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(II) (West 2016).
57. 25 U.S.C.A. §2710(2) (West 2016).
58. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(8) (West 2016).
59. 25 U.S.C.A. §2710(d)(1) (West 2016).
60. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 253, 255 (2009).
61. NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, supra note 9.
62. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Selected Population Profile in the United States:
2015 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates , http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/15_1YR/S0201//popgroup~006
(last
visited
Nov.
11,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/JS6D-7QH7?type=image] (listing unemployment rate among the American
Indian and Alaskan Native population group at 12% in 2015), with U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population
Survey , http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last updated Nov. 11, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/3KXJ-NADE] (listing highest unemployment rate nationally in 2015 at
5.7%). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months: 2015 American Commu-
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III. THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORY AND CHALLENGE IN DEFINING
THE CONTOURS OF “GROSS INCOME” UNDER THE INCOME TAX CODE
A.

GROSS INCOME

IGRA allows for a distribution of a per capita payment to members of a
tribe. Specifically, IGRA provides that “[n]et revenues . . . may be used to
make per capita payments to members of the Indian tribe only if . . . the per
capita payments are subject to Federal taxation.”63 Per capita distributions
“also are subject to special withholding requirements.”64 “Tribes may use
gaming revenue to fund tribal government operations and programs, provide
for the general welfare of their constituents, and promote tribal economic
development.”65
Per capita payments are treated as income under the Income Tax Code.
Specifically, section 61 of the Income Tax Code provides that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from
whatever source derived.” The Supreme Court stated “that this language was
used by Congress to exert ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’”66 Section
61 also enumerates a non-exhaustive list of fifteen classes of income which
constitute gross income under the Income Tax Code.67
The Income Tax Regulations reiterate the broad sweep of section 61.
They clarify “[g]ross income means all income from whatever source derived, unless excluded by law. Gross income includes income realized in any
form, whether in money, property, or services. Income may be realized,

nity
Survey
1-Year
Estimates,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/15_1YR/S1701 (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9G35ZZ3M?type=image] (listing poverty rate among the American Indian and Alaskan Native population group at 26.6% compared to 14.7% nationally in 2015).
63. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (West 2016).
64. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 12.
65. Meister et al., supra note 12, at 385.
66. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (citing Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)).
67. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2016). The fifteen items listed in Section 61 are:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived
from business; (3) Gains derived from dealings in property; (4)
Interest; (5) Rents; (6) Royalties; (7) Dividends; (8) Alimony
and separate maintenance payments; (9) Annuities; (10) Income
from life insurance and endowment contracts; (11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness; (13) Distributive
share of partnership gross income; (14) Income in respect of a
decedent; and (15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
Id.
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therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other
property, as well as in cash.”68
The default setting of the Income Tax Code is to treat all forms of income regardless of source as gross income. This includes income that is actively generated directly by the taxpayer’s efforts, passively generated by the
taxpayer’s capital investments, or indirectly received by the taxpayer in the
form of some economic benefit. The most common forms of income which
can be characterized as actively generated directly by the taxpayer include
wages and net earnings from a trade or business activity. The most common
forms of income which can be characterized as passively generated by a taxpayer’s capital investments include interest, dividends, gains, and rental income.
Indirect income is another form of income recognized by the IRS and
the courts. Indirect forms of income result in gross income to the taxpayer on
the theory that the taxpayer has received an economic benefit or has been
relieved of an obligation. Examples of indirect forms of gross income include
the payment of a CEO’s income tax liability by the corporation,69 the redemption of an outstanding debt obligation at less than face value,70 or the assumption of a non-recourse liability by the purchaser.71
Notwithstanding a statutory definition of income, the question, “What
is income?” has been one of continuing debate and controversy ever since
Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1913.72 The Supreme Court has taken
two occasions to consider the definition of “income.” The Supreme Court’s
first foray occurred during the early years of the newly enacted federal income tax. Three years after the federal income tax was enacted, the Supreme
Court addressed the question, “What is income?” in the case of Eisner v.
Macomber.73
The issue in Eisner v. Macomber was “whether . . . Congress has the
power to tax, as income of the stockholder . . . a stock dividend made lawfully
and in good faith against profits accumulated by the corporation since March
1, 1913.”74 The taxpayer was a shareholder in the Standard Oil Corporation.
The taxpayer received a 50% stock dividend from the Standard Oil Corporation. The taxpayer asserted that the stock dividend was nontaxable, while the
IRS claimed that the stock dividend was taxable. In holding for the taxpayer,
the court reasoned that:

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

26 C.F.R. § 1.61-1(a) (2016).
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Id. at 199.
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A stock dividend really takes nothing from the
property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the
interests of the shareholders. Its property is not diminished, and their interests are not increased. * * *
The proportional interest of each shareholder remains the same. The only change is in the evidence
which represents that interest, the new shares and
the original shares together representing the same
proportional interest that the original shares represented before the issue of the new ones. In short, the
corporation is no poorer and the stockholder is no
richer than they were before.75
The Court then proceeded to define “income” as “[t]he gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood
to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets . . . .”76
This approach modeled income as a result obtained from one’s labor or capital. The majority held for the taxpayer and ordered a refund of income taxes
paid. There was much critique surrounding this narrow definition of income.77
In 1955, the Supreme Court took a second look at the definition of “income” with the case of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.78 This time,
more than forty years of tax jurisprudence had developed. Both the economy
and the tax law matured considerably, and both were each developing into
even more complex institutions.
The Supreme Court used the occasion presented by Glenshaw Glass79
to determine whether an award of punitive damages constituted income under
the Income Tax Code. The taxpayer sued a competitor for antitrust violations.
The taxpayer prevailed and received an award of treble damages. The taxpayer, however, asserted that the award of punitive damages was not subject
to tax as gross income. In contrast, the IRS maintained that the payment was
includable in gross income. The Supreme Court held for the IRS reasoning
that the term gross income as used in the Income Tax Code “was used by
Congress to exert . . . ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’”80
75. Id. at 202-03.
76. Id. at 207.
77. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV.
295, 301 (contrasting the narrow definition of income the court announced in Eisner with the
much broader definition in Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1995)); see also
Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 67 (pointing out that the narrow definition
of income in Eisner gave rise to the nonphysical personal injury exclusion).
78. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 426.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 429.
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Most importantly, the Supreme Court used Glenshaw Glass to refine
and expand its earlier definition of income articulated in Macomber. This
time, the Court broadly defined “income” as resulting from “instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.” This shift in thought by the Supreme Court from
a “capital . . . labor” model, to an “accessions to wealth” model greatly expanded the scope and the reach of Congress’s taxing power under the Income
Tax Code.
Despite the statutory guidance defining gross income, two areas in tax
continually produced controversy for taxpayers and the IRS – determining
what is a prize or award, and determining what is a gift.
B.

PRIZES AND AWARDS

The first of the controversial areas involve the tax treatment of prizes
and awards. Three cases help to illustrate the challenges encountered by taxpayers and the IRS when determining whether an item is a prize or award, or
includable as gross income. In Washburn v. Commissioner, commonly
known as the Pot O’ Gold case, the taxpayer received a random phone call
from a radio station announcing that the taxpayer won a “Pot O’ Gold.”81 The
taxpayer “asked what she should do. The voice answered, ‘Nothing, Within
a half hour you will receive the money.’ Petitioner asked how much money,
and she was told $900.”82
The IRS argued that the award constituted income. Upon review, Tax
Court held that “Under the . . . set of facts, we conclude without difficulty
that the $900 received by the petitioner was an outright gift, without any of
the earmarks of income.”83
Next, in McDermott v. Commissioner,84 commonly known as the Ross
Essay case, the taxpayer entered a writing contest and ‘“was awarded * * *
the prize’, which was a check for $3000, and a certificate, ‘for the best discussion of the subject selected.’”85 The IRS maintained that the payment of
the $3000 prize constituted gross income to the taxpayer. Upon review, “the
Tax Court of the United States sustained the Commissioner”86 and held the
prize constituted income.
81. Washburn v. Comm’r, 5 T.C. 1333, 1334 (1945).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1335.
84. McDermott v. Comm’r, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
85. Id. at 586. “[T]he American Bar Association announced a prize of $3,000 to be
awarded for the best essay submitted for the year 1939 entitled, ‘To What Extent Should Decisions of Administrative Tribunals be Reviewable by the Courts?’.” McDermott v. Comm’r,
3 T.C. 929, 929 (1944).
86. McDermott, 150 F.2d at 585.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia reversed declaring that the award of the $3000 prize was not income, but a
“gift”.87 Despite the competitive nature of the writing competition and the
entry by the taxpayer, the Court of Appeals held that “the award was a gift
and not income.” Using curious language, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
“[n]o one not talking law would be likely to say that the Association paid
petitioner $3000 for writing an essay or that it paid $3000 for the essay which
petitioner wrote. In plain English the Association gave petitioner the prize.”88
The Court further reasoned “[t]he purpose of Judge Ross and the American
Bar Association in creating and administering the Ross prize was likewise to
‘give’ and to ‘incite,’ not to employ or buy.”89 The Court also placed significance on the fact that the “long-continued administrative interpretation”90 of
not collecting taxes for prizes “is entitled to great weight.”91
Finally, in Robertson v. United States,92 a composer entered a contest
and won a $25,000 prize. The taxpayer initially “included that amount in his
1947 income tax return as gross income.”93 The taxpayer subsequently “filed
a claim for refund on the ground that the award constituted a nontaxable
gift.”94
The IRS argued that the prize constituted income. The Supreme Court
accepted certiorari to resolve a split between the circuits.95 The case ultimately made it to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the prize
constituted gross income. The Supreme Court reasoned that “the discharge
of legal obligations—the payment for services rendered or consideration paid
pursuant to a contract—is in no sense a gift.”96
In 1954, Congress resolved the dispute concerning the taxability of
prizes and awards by enacting section 74.97 The Senate Report states:
[Section 74] is intended to eliminate some existing
confusion in court decisions over whether a prize is
87. Id. at 587. But see id. at 588 (Groner, C.J., dissenting) (“I am of [the] opinion that
the award to [the taxpayer] . . . was compensation, and hence income within the meaning of
the tax statutes.”).
88. Id. at 587.
89. Id. at 589.
90. Id. at 588.
91. McDermott, 105 F.2d at 588.
92. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
93. Id. at 712.
94. Id. at 713.
95. Id. The conflict was between the decision below (Robertson v. United States, 190
F.2d 680 (1951)), the District of Columbia Circuit in McDermott v. Comm’r, 150 F.2d 585
(1945), and the United States Court of Claims in Williams v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 362
(1949). Id.
96. Robertson, 343 U.S. at 713.
97. 26 U.S.C.A. § 74 (West 2016).
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income or a gift and would overrule both the Pot
O'Gold case98 and the Ross Essay Contest case99 insofar as each held prizes were not income.100
Section 74 clarified for taxpayers and the IRS alike, the question When
is a prize or award includable in gross income? Specifically, section 74 establishes a rigid and limited framework for the exclusion of prizes and
awards. As a result of section 74, prizes and awards are included in gross
income unless they comply with a narrowly defined exception. The Senate
Report expressly stated that “[a]mounts received from radio and television
give-away shows, or as door prizes, or in any similar type contest would also
not be” eligible for exclusionary treatment.101
C.

GIFTS

The other area of tax controversy involved the question, “What constitutes a gift?”. Section 102 of the Income Tax Code provides that “[g]ross
income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.”102 However, Congress did not define what constitutes a
gift for purposes of this statute. As a result, the IRS, taxpayers, and the courts
struggled in determining when a transfer of property constituted income or a
gift.
For example, in Blair v. Rosseter,103 the taxpayer worked as the “president of the Sperry Flour company”104 for a ten-year period from 1910 to
1920. “[T]he stockholders of the company, by unanimous vote, instructed the
board of directors to authorize the payment of $50,000 to the [taxpayer] as a
gift in recognition of his able and successful direction of the affairs of the

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Washburn v. Comm’r, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
McDermott v. Comm’r, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 4813 (1954).
Id.
26 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2016).
Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929). In Bass v. Hawley, the court stated:
Each of these cases in holding payments to employees to be
nontaxable gifts relies on the fact that there was no obligation
to pay and the payments were over and above the wages and
salaries due. The controlling importance of that fact has since
been denied by the Supreme Court in Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U. S. at page 730, 49 S. Ct. 499, 504, 73 L.
Ed. 918, where the question was whether the litigant owed a tax,
saying: ‘The payment for services, even though entirely voluntary, was nevertheless compensation within the statute.’
Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1933).
104. Blair, 33 F.2d at 286.

2016]

AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF TAX-FREE PER-CAP DISTRIBUTION PAYMENTS

83

company during the past ten years.”105 The taxpayer maintained that the payment constituted a gift. In contrast, the IRS maintained that the payment constituted “taxable income.”106 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “the payment . . . was a gift within the accepted meaning of that
term.”107 The court determined that “[a] gift is generally defined as a voluntary transfer or property by one to another, without any consideration or compensation therefore.”108
In Fernandez v. Fahs,109 the taxpayer and his wife sought to exclude
from gross income the value of a car they won at a baseball game. “During
the 1948 baseball season the Tampa Smokers [baseball team] . . . advertised
that they would give away a 1948 Dodge automobile” during one of their
baseball games.110 The taxpayer and his wife entered the contest and won the
automobile. They drove away with the automobile after the game. On audit,
the IRS “determined a deficiency against the [taxpayers] upon the ground
that the value of the automobile constituted taxable income to them.”111
The taxpayer testified that “[h]e did not subsequently perform any services for the ball club nor for the owners of the club. He was not asked to
appear on the radio, to have his picture taken or to make any testimonial on
behalf of the ball club.”112 The record further indicates that neither the taxpayer nor his wife “performed any services nor invested any capital as consideration for the receipt of the automobile.”113 Without citing a standard or
defining what constitutes a gift, the court starkly declared that the taxpayers
“received the automobile as a gift and not as taxable income.”114
In 1960, the Supreme Court entered the disputed and uncertain terrain
of “gifts” with the case of Commissioner v. Duberstein.115 Here, the Supreme
Court examined the issue whether a transfer of property constituted a gift.
Duberstein is a consolidation of two cases: Commissioner v. Duberstein, and
its companion case, Stanton v. Commissioner.
In the first case, Commissioner v. Duberstein, the taxpayer Duberstein
and his business contact Berman “transact[ed] . . . business with each other,
which consisted of buying and selling metals.”116 On occasion, Duberstein
would provide Berman with customer referrals. One of these referrals proved
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Fernandez v. Fahs, 144 F. Supp. 630, 630 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Fernandez, 144 F. Supp. at 632.
Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
Id. at 280.
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fruitful to Berman. In appreciation, “Berman telephoned Duberstein and said
that the information Duberstein had given him had proved so helpful that he
wanted to give” Duberstein a Cadillac automobile as a present.117 Duberstein
indicated he already owned two cars, one of them being a Cadillac. The record indicates that “Berman insisted that Duberstein accept the car, and
[Duberstein] did so, protesting however that he had not intended to be compensated for the information.”118 Duberstein asserted that the receipt of the
Cadillac constituted a gift and therefore, “did not include the value of the
Cadillac in gross income.”119
In the companion case, Stanton v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, Stanton
worked for approximately ten years as a “comptroller of the Church corporation, and [as] president” of the church’s wholly owned real estate subsidiary.120 Stanton “resigned from both positions to go into business for himself.”121 The Church and its wholly owned subsidiary adopted a resolution
awarding Stanton “a gratuity . . . of Twenty Thousand Dollars . . . provided
that, with the discontinuance of his services, the Corporation of Trinity
Church is released from all rights and claims to pension and retirement benefits . . . .”122 Stanton argued the payment constituted a gift and therefore did
not include this amount in his income.
The Supreme Court held that the transfer of the car to Duberstein constituted income instead of a gift. With respect to the companion case of Stanton, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the District Court to address the question concerning
the $20,000 gratuity.123 Most importantly, in reaching its decisions, the Supreme Court announced a standard of analysis for gifts. The Supreme Court
stated that “[a] gift in the statutory sense proceeds from a detached and disinterested generosity, ‘out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like
impulses.’ In this regard, the most critical consideration is the transferor’s
‘intention.’”124
Despite the standard announced in the Duberstein decision, the federal
courts continued grappling with the contours of a gift. For example, in Goodwin v. United States125 the taxpayer, a minister of a church, alleged that “special occasion gifts” in the form of a cash collection by the members of the
church for the taxpayer and his wife constituted a gift and therefore were
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 280.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 281.
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 291-93.
Id. at 285.
Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995).
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excludable from gross income.126 The IRS argued that the collection of cash
from the church members constituted gross income. The District Court held
for the Commissioner and the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed.127
Another case, Olk v. United States,128 is instructive because it provides
insight into the transferor’s intent. In Olk, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit examined the circumstances to see if a transfer of gambling tokes
from a customer to the craps dealer constituted income or a gift.129 The taxpayer was employed as a craps dealer in a Las Vegas gambling casino. The
taxpayer received tokes130 from customers who visited the gambling casino.
The taxpayer contended that the tokes constituted gifts. The IRS however,
maintained that the tokes were income.
At issue was whether the “[t]okes [given to the dealers were] the result
of detached and disinterested generosity on the part of . . . patrons.”131 At
trial, the District Court found
that patrons sometimes give money to dealers, other
players or mere spectators at the game, but that between 90-95% of the patrons give nothing to a
dealer. No obligation on the part of the patron exists
to give to a dealer and ‘dealers perform no service
for patrons which a patron would normally find
compensable.’132
The trial court . . . held that ‘tokes’ were gifts.133
However, on appeal the Court of Appeals found that a “detached and
disinterested generosity” was lacking. Specifically, when testing for the donor’s intention, the court found that the donor’s intent was prompted by
“[i]mpulsive generosity or superstition on the part of the players.”134 The
Court of Appeals noted,

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 150.
Id. at 153.
Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 876.
MEG ELAINE SCHNEIDER & STANLEY ROBERTS, THE EVERYTHING CASINO
GAMBLING BOOK: FEEL CONFIDENT, HAVE FUN, AND WIN BIG! 218 (2d ed. 2004) (“‘Tokes’ is
casino jargon for tips, especially for dealers.”).
131. Olk, 536 F.2d at 877.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 876.
134. Id. at 879.
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In the context of gambling in casinos open to the
public such a motive is quite understandable. However, our understanding also requires us to
acknowledge that payments so motivated are not
acts of ‘detached or disinterested generosity.’ Quite
the opposite is true. Tribute to the gods of fortune
which it is hoped will be returned bounteously soon
can only be described as an ‘involved and intensely
interested’ act.135
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the “tokes [were] taxable
income”136 in the hands of the dealers and ruled in favor of the IRS.
From a policy perspective, “[t]he rationale for the exclusion of gifts is
not altogether clear.”137 Moreover, “[t]he legislative history of section 102
does not reveal precisely why Congress exclude[s] gifts”138 from gross income. However, what is now clear, is that Duberstein provides the current
standard for determining whether a transfer of property is income or a gift,
and as the Supreme Court indicates, “the most critical consideration . . . is
the transferor’s ‘intention’.”139

IV.

ARE PER CAPITA PAYMENTS GIFTS? CONSTRUCTING THE GIFT
ARGUMENT

It is a truism in tax that the broad sweep of section 61140 requires the
inclusion of all income. It is also true that applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass that “undeniable accessions of
wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has dominion,”141 requires
the inclusion of all forms of income satisfying this standard. And, it is also
true that IGRA provides that “[n]et revenues . . . may be used to make per
capita payments to members of the Indian tribe only if . . . the per capita
payments are subject to Federal taxation . . . .”142
How then, is it possible in the face of such authority, to assert that per
capita payments made pursuant to IGRA are anything other than income?
The answer lies in the uncertainty created by IGRA. When Congress enacted
135.
136.
137.
1988).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Olk, 536 F.2d at 879.
MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 31 (3d ed.
Id.
Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2016).
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
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IGRA, did it intend the subject IGRA language, “per capita payments are
subject to Federal taxation,” to mean that the per capita, payments are only
includable in gross income under section 61 but not excludable from gross
income under section 102? Or, did Congress intend the subject IGRA language to mean that the per capita payments are both includable in gross income under section 61 and excludable from gross income under section 102?
The legislative history for IGRA is silent on this point.143 It bears noting that
income tax exclusions are a matter of legislative grace and are strictly construed by courts.144 And if a taxpayer can demonstrate they satisfy the statute,
they are entitled to access the exclusion.145 Therefore, the unresolved and
open question is whether per capita payments may qualify as “gifts” under
section 102 of the Income Tax Code?
A.

INCOME TAX STATUTE AND REGULATIONS

We begin the analysis by examining the relevant income tax statute and
underlying regulations. Section 61 of the Income Tax Code is a broad tax
rule of inclusion which provides “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”146
Section 102 of the Income Tax Code is a tax rule of exclusion and provides
“[g]ross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.”147 Section 102 however, fails to define what
constitutes a “gift” for federal income tax purposes. The underlying income
tax regulations for section 102 state “[p]roperty received as a gift . . . is not
includible in gross income . . . .”148 The income tax regulations also fail to
define what constitutes a “gift” for income tax purposes. Unfortunately, without statutory and regulatory guidance, the federal courts, taxpayers, and the
IRS are left to resolve their disputes in audit or through litigation.
B.

COMMON LAW ANALYSIS

Next, given the absence of statutory and regulatory guidance, taxpayers
and the IRS must then consider how the common law analyzes gifts. In this
regard, the Duberstein case is instructive. The Supreme Court stated that
143. See S. REP. NO. 100-446 (1988); 134 CONG. REC. H8146-01 (1988).
144. Zimmermann v. C.I.R., 241 F.2d 338, 344 (8th Cir. 1957) (citing Deputy v. du
Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940)).
145. Gross v. C.I.R., No. 3440-98, 2000 WL 1672624, at *5 (T.C. Nov. 7, 2000) (“[A
taxpayer] must bring [himself] within the clear scope of the exclusion . . . [and] bears the
burden of proof with respect to whether he is entitled to an exclusion.”).
146. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2016).
147. 26 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2016).
148. 26 C.F.R. § 1.102-1(a) (2016).
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when analyzing for a gift “[w]hat controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made.”149 Inevitably, context is an inescapable factor in any tax analysis, and it is especially relevant in a gift analysis.
When testing for the donor’s intention, one must be mindful of the guidance offered by the Duberstein court, namely, whether the transfer “proceeds
from a ‘detached and disinterested generosity’ . . . .”150 Analyzing the per
capita payment with this phrase in mind, a reasonable person will likely ask,
Why did the Tribe make the per capita payment? Here, context becomes important when inquiring into the intention of the transferor.
As both the Duberstein and the Olk cases illustrate, federal courts have
considered gifts within the context of business relationships and commercial
settings only. For example, Duberstein and its companion case, Stanton,151
both involved property transfers to the recipient within a business setting.
Duberstein occurred within the context of a supplier-buyer relationship,
Stanton occurred within the context of a retiring corporate executive, and Olk
involved payments that were given by a patron to the dealer within the context of a commercial gambling setting.152
In contrast to Duberstein, and to Olk, per capita payments arise within
a non-business context. Although the Supreme Court rejected any attempt to
distinguish between gifts made in a business context from gifts made in a
personal context,153 the Supreme Court did note that “the question [of the
transferor’s intent] here remains basically one of fact, for determination on a
case-by-case basis.”154
In this regard, discerning the intent of the transferor within the context
of the per capita distribution payment will require examining the per capita
payments on a case-by-case basis. After analyzing the reasons for these payments, a reasonable person will be drawn to the conclusion that the intention
of the Tribe in making the payment is not to award compensation, it is not to
observe a legal duty, nor is it to honor a moral duty. The per capita payment
is unequivocally free from any such indicators of employment, commerce, or
obligation. Instead, the intention behind the per capita distribution payment
is to make “a fair and equitable per capita distribution of revenues . . . from
149. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
150. Id. at 285.
151. Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959), vacated, Comm’r v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
152. Cf. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987) (where the Supreme Court found
that the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business and therefore eligible for business deductions under 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2016)).
153. “The Government suggests that we promulgate a new ‘test’ in this area to serve
as a standard to be applied by the lower courts and by the Tax Court in dealing with the numerous cases that arise. We reject this invitation.” Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
154. Id. at 290.

2016]

AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF TAX-FREE PER-CAP DISTRIBUTION PAYMENTS

89

gaming activities conducted by and on behalf of the Nation is necessary in
promoting the general welfare of the Nation and its members . . . . ”155 A fair
and equitable distribution system to promote the general welfare of the members of a community without any performance obligation on behalf of the
transferor, is the quintessential essence of a gift.
Moreover, attention must be drawn to the Supreme Court’s statement in
Duberstein that “if the payment proceeds primarily from ‘the constraining
force of any moral or legal duty,’ or from ‘the incentive of anticipated benefit’ of an economic nature, it is not a gift.”156 Native tribes do not have a
moral duty to make a per capita payment. Approximately twenty-five percent
of tribes with gaming operations make per capita payments.157 If a moral duty
were to exist, it then follows that the percentage of Native tribes making distributions would rise substantially higher to reflect the presence of a moral
obligation by Native tribes. In addition, the statement of the moral duty referenced in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bogardus158 and which is cited
by the Duberstein Court, arose within the context of providing severance
payments to departing employees and in one case, providing a death benefit
to a surviving family member.159 The moral circumstances calling for payments in Bogardus,160 namely severance payments and a death benefit, are
clearly not present when a tribe distributes a per capita payment to its members.
Olk is equally instructive because it illustrates that a donor’s motive can
be based not only on ordinary beliefs and expectations, but can include extraordinary beliefs, expectations, and as reported in Olk, superstition.161 In
Olk, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the donor’s motive for paying the dealer with the gambling tokes was to offer “[t]ribute to the gods of
fortune.”162 In contrast, the per capita payments made by Native nations to
its members are markedly different. Per capita payments are not motivated
155. HO-CHUNK
NATION
CODE,
2
H.C.C.
§
12(3)
(2006),
http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/hochunkcode/2HCC12_PerCap.pdf.
156. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
157. Facts About Indian Gaming, OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, http://oiga.org/faqs/
(last visited May 18, 2016). The Oklahoma Indian Gaming Association website reports that
“[t]hree-fourths of gaming Tribes devote all of their revenue to Tribal governmental services,
economic and community development, to neighboring communities and to charitable purposes. 75% of tribes do not give out per capita payments.” Id. The website adds that “[o]nly
about one-fourth of Tribes engaged in gaming distribute per capita payments to tribal members.” Id.
158. Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
159. Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 37 (the Court notes that “[s]ome of the recipients had been
out of the employ of the Universal company for many years; and one of them was the sister
of an employee killed in an explosion about the year 1919.”).
160. Id.
161. Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 1976).
162. Id. at 879.
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by a quid pro quo expectation, nor motived in exchange for some pecuniary
gain be it present or deferred. Nor are the per capita payments made by the
Native tribe to its members motivated by fear, reprisal, or superstition as was
demonstrated in Olk. Instead the per capita payments are made by the Native
tribe out of a detached and disinterested generosity, and out of a concern for
the well-being and care of its tribal members. The per capita payments made
by the tribes, and contemplated by IGRA, are intended to alleviate the economic hardship endured by members of many Native nations. Unlike a business or commercial investment, where a return on investment is intentionally
calculated and expected,163 there is no comparable expected return to the
Tribal nation. Instead, there is simply the desire to address the general welfare of its members. A transfer of property under these circumstances bears
the hallmark of a gift.
C.

IGRA STATUTORY ANALYSIS

Next, the statutory placement of IGRA’s tax obligation outside of the
Income Tax Code is extraordinary and remarkable. Not only does its placement outside the Income Tax Code strain the question whether per capita
payments are eligible for exclusionary treatment under the Income Tax Code,
it also raises the question whether recipients of per capita payments are eligible to claim other statutory benefits such as the personal exemption,164 or
the standard deduction.165 IGRA’s legislative history does not offer any guidance on this point. Discerning Congressional intent regarding this phrase is
difficult without clear guidance. The questions created by the IGRA phrase
“subject to Federal taxation” and its unusual placement within IGRA further
muddles an already indeterminate situation regarding Congress’s intention.
It is noteworthy to point out that IGRA’s placement of the tax language
outside of the Income Tax Code runs contrary to Congress’s expressed desire
to unify the tax laws. To that end, Congress created Subchapter B of the Income Tax Code. This subchapter captioned Items Specifically Included in
Gross Income prescribes the mandated inclusion of specific items into gross
income. This subchapter was added with the 1954 code revision.166 The report of the Senate Committee on Finance declares that it

163. See, e.g., William Langer, The Role of Private Sector Investment in International
Microfinance and the Implications of Domestic Regulatory Environments, 5 BYU INT'L L. &
MGMT. REV. 1, 8 (2008) (stating that “fully commercial investment . . . seeks market-based,
risk-adjusted returns. . . . [B]lended value investment . . . seeks commercial or near-commercial gains and a substantial social return on investment.”).
164. 26 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2016).
165. 26 U.S.C.A. § 63(c) (West 2016).
166. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61(a) (West 2016).
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has joined with the House Committee on Ways and
Means in undertaking the first comprehensive revision of the internal revenue laws since before the
turn of the century and the enactment of the income
tax. This revision includes a rearrangement of the
provisions to place them in a more logical sequence,
the deletion of obsolete material, and an attempt to
express the internal revenue laws in a more understandable manner.167
Subchapter B of the Income Tax Code promotes Congress’s goals of
logic and comprehension by indicating the inclusion into income the items
mandated by Congress in one place. For example, Congress has expressly
indicated the following items of income within Subchapter B of the Income
Tax Code: section 71 Alimony and separate maintenance payments; section
74 Prizes and awards; section 75 Dealers in tax-exempt securities; section 77
Commodity credit loans; section 78 Dividends received from certain foreign
corporations by domestic corporations choosing foreign tax credit; section
82 Reimbursement for expenses of moving; section 83 Property transferred
in connection with performance of services; section 84 Transfer of appreciated property to political organizations; and section 85 Unemployment Compensation. One writer notes:
[n]ot only has Congress expanded the list of items
specifically included in ‘gross income,’ under § 61,
it has also added a number of sections which expressly characterize certain receipts as income. In
almost every case, in expanding the scope of gross
income, Congress has been motivated by a desire to
clarify the law, to make the tax laws more equitable,
or to expand the tax base.168
To the average person, the Income Tax Code is impenetrable and incomprehensible. But to seasoned tax professionals, the structure of the Income Tax Code is a product of form, logic, and internal consistency.169 The
Income Tax Code itself has eleven subtitles with each subtitle further subdi-

167. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 4629 (1954).
168. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 26
(11th ed. 2015).
169. This is not to advance the claim that the Income Tax Code is simple and uncomplicated, for it is not. It is to advance the claim that the Income Tax Code has an expected
design and structure.
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vided by topic into parts, subparts, sections, subsections, and addressing specific subject areas such as Income Tax, Gift Tax, and Income Tax Procedure.170 Trained income tax professionals and ardent devotees of tax law look
to its expected design and predictable structure when navigating the Income
Tax Code. For instance, corporate income tax provisions are located in Subchapter C, partnership income tax provisions are located in Subchapter K,
and qualifying small business corporate provisions are located in Subchapter
S. The design structure of the Income Tax Code makes it navigable, promotes
certainty, and establishes congressional intent concerning the tax treatment
of a multitude of items.
It is not entirely out of the question for Congress to enact tax legislation
and place it outside of the Income Tax Code. For example, section 505171 of
the Bankruptcy Code provides:
[T]he court may determine the amount or legality of
any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax, or any
addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed,
whether or not paid, and whether or not contested
before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction.172
The purpose of section 505 is “to expedite the adjudication of tax liability.”173 Another example, section 960 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Code provides “[a]ny officers and agents conducting any business under authority of a United States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and local
taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as if it were conducted
by an individual or corporation.”174 The purpose of section 960 is “to equalize
the tax status of businesses being operated as going concerns by federal receivers with the tax status of their competitors.”175 However, unlike section
505 and section 960, which either authorize an income tax consequence or
describe an income tax consequence, the IGRA language is distinguishable
because it prescribes a direct income tax consequence on the taxpayer. Specifically, IGRA imposes an affirmative federal income tax obligation on a
taxpayer, namely, the inclusion into income of the per capita payment.
Simply put, sections 505 and 960 are descriptive of an income tax obligation,
170. A complete analysis of the structure and organization of the Income Tax Code,
and related tax statutes is beyond the scope of this Article. It bears noting that Title 11 and
Title 28 also contain tax statutes. E.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 505 (West 2016); 28 U.S.C.A. § 960
(West 2016) (these sections however, do not impose a tax obligation).
171. 11 U.S.C.A. § 505 (West 2016).
172. 11 U.S.C.A. § 505(a) (West 2016).
173. In re Grand Chevrolet, Inc., 153 B.R. 296, 300 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
174. 28 U.S.C.A. § 960 (West 2016).
175. In re Hubs Repair Shop, Inc., 28 B.R. 858, 868 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
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whereas the IGRA section is prescriptive of an income tax obligation. Affirmative obligations on taxpayers have been placed within the Income Tax
Code, and not without.
Moreover, the IGRA language, “shall be subject to federal tax” creates
an additional confusion. What does this language mean? Does this language
mean that a tribal member is not entitled to claim their personal exemption176
or, their standard deduction?177 For example, would a tribal member receiving a modest per capita distribution payment, say $3,000, be entitled to claim
their personal exemption or their standard deduction? A strict reading of the
IGRA language would suggest the answer to this question is “no,” thereby
making the entire amount “subject to federal tax.” The United States Tax
Court recognized IGRA’s ability to impose a tax when it reasoned “[t]hough
not specifically addressed in the Internal Revenue Code, revenue from casino
gambling conducted on American Indian reservations is specifically subjected to Federal taxes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.”178 The Tax
Court added, “The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that ‘per capita
payments [of net revenues from gaming activities conducted or licensed by
any Indian tribe] are subject to Federal taxation . . . .’”179 However, the Tax
Court did not address the question of whether a tribal member is entitled to
claim their personal exemption or standard deduction.
Moreover, when Congress intends to include items into income, it uses
clear and unequivocal language. For example, the alimony statute reads
“gross income includes,”180 the unemployment compensation statute reads
“gross income includes,”181 and the statute regulating prizes and awards reads
“gross income includes.”182 These statutes demonstrate Congress’s clear and
unequivocal intention when it invokes the phrase “gross income includes.”
In contrast, the IGRA language reads “[n]et revenues . . . may be used to
make per capita payments to members of the Indian tribe only if . . . the per
capita payments are subject to Federal taxation . . . .”183 Unfortunately, the
IGRA language is neither descriptive nor prescriptive, rather it is abstruse
and perplexing. In the case of the IGRA statute, the statutory language “per
capita payments are subject to Federal taxation” invites uncertainty and controversy into the discussion, instead of clarity and certainty.
Taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts may debate whether the placement
of the tax obligation within IGRA was intentional, an oversight, or possibly
an afterthought. To be clear, Congress has the authority to place the IGRA
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

26 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2016).
26 U.S.C.A. § 63 (West 2016).
Campbell v. Comm’r, No. 9244-95, 1997 WL 690178, at *3 (T.C. 1997).
Id.
26 U.S.C.A. § 71(a) (West 2016).
26 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West 2016).
26 U.S.C.A. § 74 (West 2016).
25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
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tax language wherever it deems proper. But, if Congress is signaling a new
structure for the administration of the income tax laws, then it should do so
clearly and unambiguously. For instance, what administrative challenges
would arise if in addition to the IGRA tax language, Congress began placing
separate taxing statutes for merger transactions in Title 15 (Commerce and
Trade), for wages in Title 29 (Labor), or embezzlement in Title 18 (Crimes
and Criminal Procedure), instead of the Income Tax Code. Without clear
guidance from Congress, taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts will grapple with
the uncertainty and with the contrasting results that will inevitably arise.
D.

THE EXCLUSIONARY PROVISO

Finally, it bears noting that section 61 opens with an exclusionary proviso that reads “Except as otherwise provided . . . .”184 This proviso is intended to allow statutory exclusions to operate with full force when applicable. It is undisputed that section 61 mandates the inclusion into gross income
of the per capita payment. However, the open and continuing question is
whether the per capita payments are eligible to be excluded as a gift pursuant
to section 102 of the Income Tax Code. A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation in tax law is “that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed.”185 If a native member of a tribe can successfully demonstrate that a
gift is intended, then section 102 should apply and exclude the payment from
gross income. Clearly, the opening proviso in section 61 contemplates the
use of one of the many exclusionary sections of the Income Tax Code, including the gift provision of section 102. The Supreme Court has noted that
the structure and placement of language is instrumental in discerning congressional intent.186 The plain language of section 61 clearly contemplates
circumstances where income will be excluded from gross income.
Absent Congressional guidance, a harmonious interpretation of the relevant federal statutes in this case would allow for the exclusion of the per
capita payment as a gift under section 102187 in addition to its inclusion into
income under the IGRA statute.188 In United States v. Rodgers, the Supreme
Court declared that where “one interpretation contravenes both traditional
rules of law and the common sense and common values on which they are
built, the fact that it favors the Government’s interests cannot be dispositive.”189 This statement holds true in the case of per capita payments.
184. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61(a) (West 2016).
185. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995).
186. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (“Congress’s intent . . .
primarily is discerned from the language of the . . . statute. . . . Also relevant . . . is the ‘structure
and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ . . . .”).
187. 26 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2016).
188. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (West 2016).
189. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 724 (1983).
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ARE TRIBAL PER CAPITA PAYMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THE
ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DISTRIBUTION PAYMENTS?

Opponents of the gift argument can be expected to argue that payments
made to recipients of per capita distributions are similar to payments made
to recipients under the Alaska Permanent Fund. The analogy is, if payments
from the Alaska Permanent Fund to Alaskan recipients are taxable, then payments from a Native fund to its tribal members should be similarly taxable.
However, as discussed below, a key distinction between the two programs
exists and must be given due consideration.
In 1976, Alaska voters established The Alaska Permanent Fund.
The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, [is] a
government instrumentality of the State of Alaska
created . . . by [state statute] to manage and invest
the assets of the Alaska Permanent Fund and other
funds designated by law, by and through its Board
of Trustees who, under [state statute], are responsible for managing the affairs of the Corporation . . .
.190
The purpose of the fund is to “provide a means of conserving a portion
of the state’s revenue from mineral resources to benefit all generations of
Alaskans.”191 To begin, recipients of Alaska Permanent Fund payment are
subject to express performance obligations and qualification requirements.192

190. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORPORATION BYLAWS 1 (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.apfc.org/_amiReportsArchive/2011_02_Bylaws.pdf; see also ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 37.13, 37.13.040 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 29th Leg.).
191. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 37.13.020 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of
the 29th Leg.). The statute provides:
The legislature finds with respect to the fund that
(1) the fund should provide a means of conserving a portion of
the state's revenue from mineral resources to benefit all generations of Alaskans;
(2) the fund's goal should be to maintain safety of principal
while maximizing total return;
(3) the fund should be used as a savings device managed to allow the maximum use of disposable income from the fund for
purposes designated by law.
Id.
192. For example, to qualify for a 2015 Permanent Fund Dividend you must be able to
answer yes to all of the following statements:
I was a resident of Alaska during all of calendar year 2015;
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The Alaska Administrative Code contains explicit procedures to qualify for
the payment.193 Eligible individuals must submit an application within a prescribed time period. In addition, strict requirements must be satisfied, including “residency,” an “intent to remain,” and a limited “allowable absence.”194
Moreover, individuals may lose the right to a payment if they engage in criminal activities that lead to a “felony conviction” or a “misdemeanor conviction.”195
In contrast, per-cap distribution requirements do not impose performance obligations on its members’ eligibility to receive a distribution payment. The only criteria to receive a per capita payment is satisfying the enrollment requirement for the tribe. “Among tribal nations in the U.S., many
different enrollment requirements exist. These criteria include blood quantum, lineal descendancy, and residency. Enrollment requirements may be
viewed as reflecting particular ideas of kinship and identity, while they also
confer a citizenship status that comes with legal rights.”196 The determination
On the date I apply for the 2016 Permanent Fund Dividend, I
have the intent to remain an Alaska resident indefinitely;
I have not claimed residency in any other state or country or
obtained a benefit as a result of a claim of residency in another
state or country at any time since December 31, 2014;
I was not:
Sentenced as a result of a felony conviction during 2015;
Incarcerated at any time during 2015 as the result of a felony
conviction; or
Incarcerated at any time during 2015 as the result of a misdemeanor conviction in Alaska if convicted of a prior felony or
two or more prior misdemeanors since January 1, 1997;
If absent from Alaska for more than 180 days, I was absent on
an allowable absence; and
I was physically present in Alaska for at least 72 consecutive
hours at some time during 2014 or 2015. Eligibility Requirements.
ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., http://pfd.alaska.gov/Eligibility/Requirements (last visited May 17, 2016).
193. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.23.005 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of
the 29th Leg.).
194. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.23.005(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 29th Leg.).
195. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.23.005(d) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 29th Leg.).
196. Jessica Bardill, Tribal Sovereignty and Enrollment Determinations, NAT’L CONG.
OF AM. INDIANS,
http://genetics.ncai.org/tribal-sovereignty-and-enrollment-determinations.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).

2016]

AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF TAX-FREE PER-CAP DISTRIBUTION PAYMENTS

97

of tribal membership and the underlying enrollment requirement is an inherent right exercised by Native nations.
Unlike Alaska fund recipients, Native Americans are not restricted geographically, do not have to declare any intent to reside within a geographic
location, nor disclose criminal offenses. The absence of qualification requirements and performance obligations required of Native members is a substantial and material distinction existing between per capita payments from the
Alaska Fund Payment.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had occasion to
examine whether the Alaska fund payments constitutes a gift for income tax
purposes. In Griesen v. United States,197 the taxpayers challenged the inclusion of dividend payments from the Alaska Permanent Fund in gross income.
The taxpayer advanced the argument that “the dividends are excludable as
gifts.”198 In support of their gift argument the taxpayers advanced the theory
“that a distribution which is in the nature of excess wealth, no longer needed
by the donor, and therefore passed on [to] the donee, is excludable from gross
income.”199
The taxpayers advanced the argument that the taxpayers, and not the
state, owned the state’s natural resources and that any return by the state to
the taxpayers was a return of the taxpayer’s property. The Griesen court rejected this assertion. The Griesen court examined the Alaska state constitution and held that “[i]n adopting their constitution, the people of the State of
Alaska have very clearly constituted the state as owner of the natural resources which give rise to the fund in question.”200 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that dividend payments from the Alaska Permanent fund
were not gifts, and therefore were required to be included in the taxpayer’s
income.
In a subsequent letter, Alaska Representative Vic Kohring wrote to the
Office of the Attorney General asking “whether the State of Alaska could
declare the annual dividend a gift and thereby avoid the federal income tax
liability.”201 The Alaska Attorney General responded “that [Alaska fund]
payments are not gifts, but are income subject to federal income taxation, and
there is nothing the [Alaska state] legislature could do to change this outcome”202 to the issue of what constitutes a gift.

197. Griesen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987).
198. Id. at 918.
199. Id. at 920 n. 4.
200. Id. at 918.
201. Letter from Bruce M. Botelho, Alaska Attorney Gen., to Vic Kohring, Alaska
State Legislator (Dec. 8, 1997), http://law.alaska.gov/pdf/opinions/opinions_1997/97035_663980177.pdf.
202. Id.
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Unlike the Alaskan Fund, where the State of Alaska is under a legal
obligation to pay recipients,203 there is no comparable legal duty imposed on
a Native tribe to make a payment to its members. The declaration of a per
capita payment by a Native nation is not a mandatory act, it is a discretionary
act. The discretion to make a per capita payment falls exclusively within each
Tribe’s right to self-governance.204
F.

ARE PER CAPITA PAYMENTS SIMILAR TO UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION?

Opponents of the gift argument may also argue that the per capita payment is similar to unemployment compensation and therefore should be includable in income. The theory of unemployment compensation payments is
that such payments are substitutes for income. The tax court noted that “[t]he
legislative history of section 85 indicates that Congress considered unemployment compensation benefits as a substitute for taxable wages.”205
In contrast to unemployment compensation payments, per capita payments are not a substitute for income. Unemployment compensation is meant
to insure against an interruption of income and provide a measure of financial
security to the recipient in the event a stream of income is interrupted. Per
capita payments do not insure against a stream of income. Rather, per capita
payments are dependent on two variables, the net income of the gaming operation and the intention of the Native tribe to make a distribution.
Moreover, unemployment compensation payments are based on eligibility criteria.206 Again, other than satisfying the tribal membership requirement, there is no other eligibility criteria to receiving a per capita payment.

V. CONCLUSION
Early in the history of the federal income tax jurisprudence the Supreme
Court stated:

203. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 43.23.005-43.23.095 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d
Reg. Sess. of the 29th Leg.).
204. See Gabriel S. Galanda, Tribal Per Capitas and Self-Termination, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 13, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/08/13/tribal-capitas-and-self-termination (discussing a 2006 proposed
amendment to IGRA “that would have required federal oversight” of per capita payments and
curbed “the improper use of tribal per capita dollars.”).
205. Brown v. Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1557 (T.C. 1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 951445 (1978)).
206. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/500 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99906 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (Illinois eligibility requirements); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws) (California eligibility requirements).
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If the sum of money under consideration was a gift
and not compensation, it is exempt from taxation
and cannot be made taxable by resort to any form of
subclassification. If it be in fact a gift, that is an end
of the matter; and inquiry whether it is a gift of one
sort or another is irrelevant.207
This principle continues to ring true today. The challenge for courts,
taxpayers, and the IRS is in determining whether a transfer of property constitutes income or a gift. In this regard, the question asked is whether per
capita payments constitute gifts for federal income tax purposes? Regrettably, the Income Tax Code and the underlying regulations do not define a
“gift” for income tax purposes. Therefore, to answer this question one must
seek guidance in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Duberstein v. Commissioner. As the Supreme Court eloquently noted a gift “proceeds from a ‘detached and disinterested generosity,’ . . . ‘out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.” The final determinant, is the intention of the
transferor. “Since 1988, tribes have historically used gaming profit to support
a variety of social and economic programs and services, including health
care, housing development, educational programs, elderly care, vocational
training, environmental services, loans, scholarships, and business development.”208
In discerning the intention of the transferor when making a per capita
payment, it is essential to note the following factors: the tribes do not make
per capita payment to its member in exchange for goods or services; the per
capita payments do not represent compensation for any service, fee, or a commission; the recipients did not engage in any activity giving rise to a claim
for compensation; the per capita payments do not represent income derived
from a trade or business activity, nor did the recipients engage in any activity
that can be construed to be a trade or business.
In addition, the per capita payments do not constitute a prize or award;
the per capita payment is not given by the tribe in recognition of some
achievement as would be in the case of a Pulitzer Prize winner or Nobel Prize
winner; the per capita payment is not a statutory fringe benefit because fringe
benefits apply only within an employer-employee context, and the nationmember relationship does not create an employer-employee relationship.
Moreover, the absence of a quid-pro-quo, an exchange, a returning performance obligation, or an expectation or any return whatsoever, leads to the
undeniable assertion, that per capita payments are gifts. When viewed from
the perspective of transferor, the incontrovertible truth is that a per capita
payment is a gift. There is no exchange of goods or services. Additionally,
207.
208.

Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 40 (1937).
Meister et al., supra note 12, at 385.
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there is no expectation of a future benefit to the tribe, nor a performance obligation required of the donee-tribal member.
Lacking any indicia of an expectation of a return or profit, or an expectation of a quid-pro-quo, a reasonable person is led to the likely conclusion
that the intent of the tribe, as transferor of property, is to make a gift of property to its member. As such, per capita payments qualify as gifts and are
therefore, excludable from gross income.
In the final analysis, if Congress is concerned with an excessive exclusion, Congress can limit the amount of the exclusion either by dollar amount,
as a percentage of AGI, or by index, as it has done in the case of unemployment compensation.

